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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the possibility of using savings from 
major reductions in Third World defense spending as stimulus to economic growth. 
This reorientation of expenditures is particularly significant in light of new World 
Bank and International Monetary policies directed toward reducing lending to 
countries with excessive levels of military expenditure. The main.findings of the study 
suggest that reduced military expenditures, unless con.fined to arms imports, are 
unlikely in and of themselves to provide much of an impetus for accelerated growth. 
RESUME 
Les pays en developpement peuvent-ils stimuler leur croissance economique 
en utilisant les economies realisees par Les compressions des depenses militaires ? 
Une telle reorientation des depenses prend une importance accrue en regard des 
nouvelles politiques monetaires internationales et de la Banque mondiale visant d 
reduire Les prets aux pays dont le niveau de depenses militaires est excessif. Les 
donnees de cette etude suggerent qu 'une reduction des depenses militaires ne suffit 
pas en elle-meme - d mo ins qu 'elle ne s 'applique d la reduction des importations 
d'armements - pour stimuler la croissance economique. 
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INTRODUCTION 
During the 1980s there was a slowdown in defense spending and arms imports 
in many developing countries, especially in the Middle East, and to a lesser extent 
South Asia and Northern Africa. In large part, reductions in allocations to the 
military have been brought on by growing fiscal problems, forcing governments to 
reorder their spending priorities. It is apparent that for the developing world as a 
whole, countries are examining the potential benefits of reduced allocations to the 
military. Depending on the relative impact of defense spending, shifts in resources 
may significantly affect the economic performance of these countries. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the likelihood of major ''peace 
dividends" acting as a stimulus for Third World economic growth. In doing so, the 
study addresses the following questions: 
1. Did defense expenditures and arms imports hinder or aid developing 
country growth in the 1980s? 
2. Were military expenditures and/or arms imports associated with external 
indebtedness during this period and, if so, in what manner? 
3. Did defense expenditures and/or arms imports impact uniformly or vary 
between groups of countries? If variation occurred by groups, which 
clusters are relevant in this regard? 
The main hypothesis of the study is that developing countries are likely to 
show considerable variations with regard to the manner in which defense 
expenditures affect economic growth. In turn, these variations reflect the underlying 
economic health of developing cotintries and, thus, their relative ability to minimize 
potential adverse effects associated with increased defense burdens. 
I. LITERATURE SURVEY -THE IMPACT OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES 
A body of conventional wisdom has amassed over the years concerning the 
causes and consequences of Third World militarization. More often than not in the 
early literature this wisdom has been anecdotal and biased towards the standard 
"guns versus butter" analogies. Since the modem defense establishment is a heavy 
consumer of technical and managerial manpower and foreign exchange, resources 
that are especially scarce in the Third World, the conventional wisdom is that 
increased defense burdens should reduce the overall rate of growth (Chan, 1986; 
Deger and West, 1987). 
To test this theory, a rapidly growing body of empirical research has attempted 
to identify the impact of defense spending on various aspects of economic 
development and growth. Numerous studies have examined various aspects of the 
debate. Unfortunately, no consensus has emerged. In the original study, Benoit 
(1978) found strong evidence to suggest that defense spending encouraged the 
growth of civilian output per capita in less developed countries. 
On the other hand, Rothschild (1977) concluded that increased military 
expenditures lowered economic growth by reducing exports in 14 OECD countries 
during 1956-69. In his examination of 54 developing countries for the sample period 
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1965-73, Lim (1983) found defense spending to be detrimental to economic growth. 
Deger and Sen (1983), Leontief and Duchin (1983), Faini, Annez and Taylor (1984), 
Biswas and Ram (1986), and Grobar and Porter (1989) also found evidence refuting 
the claim that defense spending stimulates economic growth. 
In contrast, research examining the economic impact of Third World military 
expenditure utilizing various sub-groupings of countries (Table 1) has tended to 
contradict these findings. 
Much of this research implicitly argues that, in certain economic situations, by 
creating a stable environment it is possible that added defense expenditures may 
stimulate higher rates of investment, technological progress, technology transfer and 
hence increased overall growth (Wolf, 1981). 
This research (Frederiksen and Looney, 1982; Frederiksen and Looney, 
1982b; Frederiksen and Looney, 1983; Frederiksen and Looney, 1985; Looney and 
Frederiksen, 1986; Looney and Frederiksen, 1986a; and Looney and Frederiksen, 
1987a) has gone through various stages and levels of sophistication, with the initial 
studies largely confined to ordinary least squares regression techniques using 
Benoit's data set for the 1950-65 period. In the original study, Frederiksen and 
Looney (1982) using this methodology grouped countries on the basis of 
discriminant analysis with savings and investment used as discriminating variables. 
Here it was found that countries with relatively high levels of savings and investment 
experienced positive impacts on growth, while the impact was statistically 
insignificant for countries experiencing low levels of savings and investment. 
A second study (Frederiksen and Looney, 1983) also used Benoit's sample 
countries, but this time countries fell into groups largely on the basis of their foreign 
exchange earnings, import elasticity, and productivity of investment. Again, 
relatively unconstrained countries experienced positive impacts on growth stemming 
from defense expenditures, while the relatively foreign exchange constrained 
countries showed a statistically insignificant but negative impact. 
Using a later time period, 1965-73, (Frederiksen and Looney, 1985) and again 
grouping developing countries on the basis of their relative savings and investment, 
it appears that the relatively unconstrained countries enjoyed a positive impact 
stemming from defense expenditures. These initial studies examined only the impact 
of defense expenditures on growth. More recently, analysis in the area has become 
more sophisticated, utilizing more elaborate statistical devices and/or more subtle 
country groupings. For example, the studies examining the effects of relative 
resource constraint represent a more elaborate variant of earlier themes in that they 
use factor analysis for selecting variables for subsequent discriminant analysis. 
As before, analysis produced two groups of Third World countries. This time 
the grouping reflected total access to foreign resources - exports, external 
borrowing and the like. Again, countri~ with abundant foreign exchange derived 
positive impacts on growth from military expenditures while that group of countries 
experiencing foreign exchange shortages found growth unaffected by military 
spending (Looney and Frederiksen, 1986, Looney, 1987). 
Dividing Third World countries on the basis of their indigenous production (or 
lack of) of at least one major weapons system (following Neuman, 1984), it appears 
that for the 1970-82 period, Third World military producers experienced positive 
impacts from military expenditures on growth, investment, savings, but declines in 
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productivity, while non-producers experienced declines in growth and investment 
(Looney and Frederiksen, 1987a; Looney, 1989a and 1989b). 
Groupings of Third World countries on the basis of regime type (military or 
civilian) also produced similar results with military regimes obtaining positive 
impacts from military expenditures (Looney, 1988, 1989, 1990). The same pattern 
emerged (Looney, 1988, 1990a) with countries grouped on the basis of the 
legitimacy of government (and threat faced by the regime from internal or external 
sources). 
In recent years, analysis has branched into more complex issues, and utilized 
both time series and simultaneous equation models estimated by two and three stage 
least squares regression techniques (Looney, 1986, 1987a, 1988c, 1988d). Here, 
attempts are being made to incorporate the demand for military expenditures along 
with their impacts in an attempt to determine feedbacks from one to the other. 
Interestingly enough, the results produced by these techniques tend to confirm the 
results obtained from simpler, more naive models. 
In short, the research summarized above demonstrates a consistent pattern 
whereby certain groups of Third World countries - usually the more successful 
economically, stable politically, or those engaged in military production derive 
positive impacts from military spending. Those countries relatively unsuccessful 
economically, more politically unstable or lacking a domestic arms industry fail to 
derive any positive economic impacts from defense expenditures. 
Having said this it is important to note that a number of adverse effects stem 
from defense expenditures. This is true even in those countries experiencing higher 
overall rates of growth from increased allocations to defense. In particular, countries 
with an indigenous arms industry may suffer a deterioration in the distribution of 
income from added defense expenditures (Looney, 1989b). The same may also occur 
in military regimes as the authorities shift income from urban consumers to industrial 
groups. 
A major limitation to the studies cited above is that by their nature cross-
sectional studies are very aggregative, thus making reference to specific countries 
hazardous at best. One exception is Lebovic and Ishaq's (1987) study of defense 
spending in the Middle East. Using a pooled time-series, cross-sectional analysis on 
various groupings of Middle Eastern States, they found that higher military spending 
tended to suppress economic growth in the non-oil states of the Middle East during 
the 1973-84 period. 
However, while Lebovic and Ishaq drew on time series data, they were not 
able to incorporate the potential effects of lags between the time defense 
expenditures occur and the period of maximum economic impact. In this regard 
Nehama Babin (1989) has noted that incorporating the time variable into analysis 
can be critical because some relationships that may exist over time disappear in the 
short run and vice versa. Clearly at the.national level, development usually requires 
a series of changes that occur through systems, which involve organizations, 
agencies, economic structures and technological change. Consequently (as Babin 
concludes) it is unjustifiable to assume that a country's defense spending will have 
an immediate, or even short-term, effect on national economic performance. 
Babin's main finding was that while short-run economic impacts of defense 
expenditure may be nil or even negative, the longer term effect on growth is likely to 
be positive. Along these lines, Kick and Sharda's (1986) analysis indicated that an 
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increase in the military manpower ratio does have a significant positive effect on two 
indicators of development, infrastructure and social welfare. This impact occurs with 
a fairly long (twelve year) lag. Kick and Sharda also found that the relationship over 
a 12 year period is positive. Militarization, whether measured by expenditures or size 
of the military, does contribute to development. 
Summing up the research in this area: depending on the economic 
environment, defense expenditures have a number of channels through which they 
transmit impacts to the general economy. These include: 
1. Resource Allocation Effects. Resource allocation effects occur when 
increases in military expenditures divert or re-allocate resources away 
from domestic civilian investment, public expenditures on government 
capital investment and current account expenditures on non-military 
inputs. 
2. Resource Mobilization Effects. Increases in military expenditures are 
expected to influence domestic savings through the following linkages: a 
reduction in social services, additional taxes, an increase in the social 
discount rate, and inflation. 
3. Spin-off Effects. Military expenditure have impacts on economic growth 
through spin-off effects on human capital (such as may result from 
military training, education and modernization) and on the productivity of 
investment (such as provided by technology transfers). 
4. Aggregate Demand Effects. In an economy with underutilized productive 
capacity, increased aggregate demand from military expenditures will 
result in increased output. This leads to a rise in capacity utilization and 
profit rates, in turn indudng an increase in investment rates thus placing 
the economy on a higher long-term growth path. 
5. Debt Accumulation Effect. The debt accumulation effect describes the 
impact on current performance of debt accumulation attributable to past 
acquisition of military goods and services from abroad. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
Given the conflicting nature of impacts of these factors it is not clear a priori 
whether military expenditures will promote or hinder economic growth. The final 
effect on economic growth is the net outcome of positive and negative impacts 
conveyed through the various channels. The net outcome is likely to differ across 
countries and over time. 
As a starting point and to get a broad overview of the main patterns 
characterizing the interrelationship between defense expenditures, arms imports, 
debt, and economic performance in the 1980s a set 1 of these variables were factor 
1. The variables included (in order of listing in Table l): (l) total external debt as a percentage 
of exports, 1989; (2) the resource balance as a percentage of GDP, 1989; (3) the share of savings in GDP, 
1989; (4) the average share of anns imports in total imports over the period 1989-1989; (5) the average 
share of anns imports in total imports over the period 1972-1979; (6) the average annual rate of GDP 
growth during the period 1980-89; (7) the average annual rate of growth in imports, 1980-89; (8) the aver-
age annual rate of growth in private consumption, 1980-89; (9) the average annual rate of growth in gross 
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analyzed (Rummel, 1970). This exercise (Table 1) identified five main trends 2 in the 
data: 
Table 1 
Factor Analysis: Developing Country Patterns 
of Military Expenditures, Growth and External Debt 
(factor loadings) 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
Debt Growth Public Military Debt 
Arms Spending Spending Service 
Imports Debt 
Debt/Exports 1989 0.888* -0.190 0.011 0.063 0.167 
Res Bal/GDP 1989 -0.803* -0.266 0.052 0.034 0.173 
Savings /GDP 1989 -0.798* 0.193 -0.013 0.277 0.064 
Arms Imp 1980-89 0.775* 0.008 0.056 0.395 0.063 
Arms Imp 1972-89 0.771 * 0.032 0.138 0.412 0.038 
GDP growth 80-89 0.038 0.899* -0.026 0.246 -0.063 
Import growth 80-89 -0.078 0.862* 0.080 0.059 -0.065 
Priv Cons 80-89 0.041 0.790* 0.162 0.049 0.157 
Investment 80-89 0.052 0.757* -0.336 0.040 -0.231 
Invest /GDP 1989 -0.287 0.547* -0.078 0.363 -0.106 
Govt Cons 80-89 0.186 0.540* -0.227 0.110 -0.219 
Govt Exp/GNP 80-89 -0.158 0.060 0.847* 0.004 -0.063 
Govt Exp/GDP 72-79 -0.010 -0.001 0.831* 0.251 -0.079 
Debt/ GDP 1980 0.383 -0.069 0.687* 0.128 0.267 
Debt I GDP 1989 0.489 -0.316 0.629* 0.065 0.210 
Exports / GDP 89 -0.469 0.050 0.620* -0.128 -0.232 
Govt Cons/GDP 89 0.134 -0.029 0.556* -0.261 -0.221 
Av Milx I GE 72-79 0.082 0.299 -0.087 0.865* -0.049 
Av Milx I GE 80-89 O.o75 0.057 -0.287 0.818* -0.073 
Milx I GNP 80-89 0.077 0.162 0.379 0.802* -0.046 
Milx / GNP 72-79 0.121 0.219 0.336 0.787* -0.036 
Interest/ Exp 80 -0.212 -0.012 -0.025 -0.021 0.900* 
Debt Serv fExp 80 -0.199 -0.044 0.006 0.060 0.877* 
Debt Serv jExp 89 0.436 0.085 0.084 0.108 0.737* 
Interest/ Exp 89 0.076 -0.155 -0.089 -0.097 0.710* 
Eigen Values 5.470 5.140 3.464 3.299 2.138 
Notes: Based on oblique factor rotation (SPSS, 1990). 
* - loadings over 0.50. 
capital formation, 1980-89; (10) the share of investment in GDP, 1989; (11) the average annual rate of 
growth in government consumption, 1980-89; (12) the average share of government expenditures in GNP 
over the period 1980-89; (13) the average share' of government expenditures in GNP over the period 
1972-89; (14) the percentage of total external debt in GDP in 1980; (15) the percentage of total external 
debt in GDP in 1989; (16) the share of exports in GDP, 1989; (17) the share of government consumption 
in GDP, 1989; (18) the average share of military expenditures in the central government budget, 
1972-1979; ( 19) the average share of military expenditures in the central government budget, 1980-89; 
(20) the average share of military expenditures in GNP 1980-89; (21) the ratio of interest payments on the 
external debt to exports, 1980; (22) the ratio of debt service payments to exports, 1989; and (23) the ratio 
of interest payments to exports, 1989. 
2. Selected on the basis of having Eigen Values greater than 2.0. 
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1. Debt/Arms Imports. The main trend in the data was represented by the 
high correlation of arms imports share of total imports and the ratio of total 
external debt to exports. Several structural variables, the resource balance 
and the share of savings in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (1989) were 
also included in this factor. The resource balance roughly corresponds to 
the current account in the balance of payments. 
2. Growth. Here it is apparent that many of the overall measures of 
macroeconomic growth in the 1980s were highly correlated. High growth 
was also strongly associated with the share of national resources devoted 
to investment. 
3. Public Spending/Debt. The third major dimension in the data is that 
depicting the close relationship between government expenditures and the 
overall external debt burden. Also in this factor is the share of exports in 
GDP, perhaps indicating that countries with a high share of resources 
allocated to exports are relatively credit worthy. 
4. Military Expenditures. This factor is comprised largely of the share of 
defense expenditures in the central government budget and the military 
burden, (the share of national resources allocated to the military). 
Interestingly, arms imports as a share of total imports is only weakly 
correlated with these variables. 
5. Debt Service. The final factor is comprised of four measures of debt 
service - interest payments and total debt service as a share of exports in 
1980 and 1989. 
The individual country factor scores on each of these dimensions (Table 2) 
have a mean of zero. Thus they provide an index of the relative ranking of countries. 
As anticipated, the Middle East countries have by far the highest defense burdens 
(Factor 4), while many of the Latin American countries score relatively high in terms 
of their debt service burden (Factor 5). The economic success of the East Asian 
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Table 2 (cont) 
Developing Country Rankings: 
Military Expenditures, Growth and External Debt 
(factor loadings) 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
Debt Growth Public Military Debt 
Arms Spending Spending 
Imports Debt 
Rwanda 0.63 0.38 -1.31 -0.64 -1.14 
India 0.50 1.06 -1.14 0.40 -0.29 
China -0.91 2.15 -0.78 2.03 -1.32 
Haiti 0.13 -1.24 -1.04 -0.48 -1.35 
Kenya 0.11 0.61 0.29 -0.53 0.45 
Pakistan 0.67 1.21 -0.42 1.13 -0.13 
CAR 0.61 -0.23 -0.35 -0.92 -1.32 
Ghana 0.33 0.16 -0.86 -1.18 0.o7 
Togo 0.16 0.21 1.20 -0.74 -0.41 
Zambia 0.25 -1.11 1.44 0.87 0.00 
Sri Lanka 0.o7 0.84 0.27 -0.97 -0.60 
Indonesia -0.69 0.75 -0.63 0.18 0.00 
Mauritania 0.44 -0.50 2.35 1.18 0.32 
Bolivia 0.26 -1.10 -0.34 0.25 1.60 
Egypt 1.13 0.68 2.40 3.68 0.06 
Senegal 0.16 0.29 0.15 -0.69 0.45 
Zimbabwe -0.27 -0.39 0.36 0.48 -1.53 
Philippines -0.36 -0.34 -0.63 -0.09 1.12 
Ivory Coast 0.00 -0.43 1.35 -1.12 1.18 
Dominican Rep -0.42 0.27 -0.78 -0.46 -0.23 
Morocco 0.16 0.60 0.46 0.72 1.10 
Papua 0.04 0.37 1.03 -1.44 -0.61 
Honduras 0.20 -0.03 -0.10 -0.44 -0.17 
Guatemala 0.05 -1.59 -1.67 -0.15 -1.17 
Congo 0.11 -0.15 2.37 -0.06 -0.06 
Cameroon -0.06 0.o7 -0.72 -0.57 -0.44 
Peru -0.22 -1.14 -0.57 1.81 0.80 
Ecuador -0.03 -0.46 -0.52 0.58 1.37 
Paraguay -0.34 0.01 -1.12 -0.07 -0.42 
El Salvador 0.32 -0.57 -1.31 0.33 -1.19 
Colombia -0.42 0.31 -1.09 -0.54 0.77 
Thailand -0.73 1.74 -0.51 0.38 -0.28 
Jamaica -0.48 0.10 1.42 -1.11 0.00 
Tunisia -0.40 0.29 1.04 -0.58 -0.59 
Turkey -0.11 1.24 -0.22 0.62 1.33 
Panama -0.22 -1.30 1.81 -0.91 -1.16 
Chile -0.76 -0.18 0.18 0.58 1.30 
Costa Rica -0.18 0.72 0.38 -1.34 0.58 
Mauritius -0.60 2.03 0.59 -1.83 -1.09 
Mexico -0.48 -0.29 -0.61 -1.00 2.54 
Argentina -0.12 -1.41 -0.35 0.64 1.74 
Malaysia -1.39 0.72 1.07 0.24 -1.26 
Algeria -0.18 0.26 0.25 -0.04 1.08 
Venezuela -1.05 -0.50 0.13 -0.30 0.94 
Brazil -0.68 Q.65 -0.64 -0.71 2.77 
Hungary -1.06 -0.17 1.25 0.92 -0.11 
Uruguay -0.61 -0.97 -0.30 -0.14 0.10 
Yugoslavia -1.80 -0.98 -1.72 3.03 -0.62 
Gabon -0.97 -0.61 1.48 -0.23 -0.92 
Trinidad -1.17 -2.57 0.51 -0.45 -1.73 
Portugal -0.68 1.06 0.65 0.01 -0.28 
South Korea 
Source: Derived from analysis in Table 1. 
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The next step in the analysis was to determine if some of the patterns between 
defense expenditures and economic growth observed in earlier periods carried over 
into the 1980s. Specifically, did the net impact of military expenditures produce a 
positive or neutral effect in countries characterized by relatively few resource 
constraints and negative in those countries encountering resource shortages? 
On the assumption that resource constraints ultimately affect the overall rate of 
economic growth, our sample of countries was divided into two groups on the basis 
of their score on Factor 2 - the growth factor. Countries with a factor score less than 
0 were classified as low growth (and presumably relatively resource constrained), 
while those with factor scores greater than 0 were placed in the high growth group 
(and were presumed to be relatively resource unconstrained). An examination of the 
means of a number of economic and defense expenditures for each group presents 
some interesting contrasts (Table 3): 
1. Both groups of countries had relatively similar defense burdens (the share 
of Gross Domestic Product) allocated to the military. The high growth 
group was marginally lower: 2.6 versus 2.9% during the 1972-79 period, 
and 2.8 versus 3.0 during the 1980-89 period. 
2. While both groups of countries allocated roughly similar shares of their 
government budgets to the military in the 1970s, the budget share 
allocated to defense was considerably lower in the high growth countries 
(11.4 versus 15.6%) during the 1980s. 
3. In contrast the high growth countries had considerably lower shares of 
their imports accounted for by arms imports. This figure was about one 
half for the 1970s (2.5% versus 4.9%), but rose a bit in the 1980s to 3.1 % 
for the high growth countries versus 4.5 for the low growth countries. 
4. Of course in terms of overall income growth the high growth countries did 
better 5.4 versus 3.8 in the 1970s and 3.7 versus 0.9% in the 1980s. 
Perhaps of greater significance the high growth countries maintained 
relatively high rates of investment growth during both periods, but the rate 
of capital formation in the low growth countries fell from 4.5% per annum 
in the 1970s to -4.4% in the 1980s. 
5. These growth patterns were also reflected, albeit to a lesser extent in 
exports, government consumption and private sector consumption. The 
low growth countries also had a considerable contraction in imports (from 
3.7% in the 1970s to -4.0% in the 1980s). 
6. In terms of the relative size of the public sector, the low growth countries 
had a higher ratio of government expenditures to Gross National Product 
(GNP) in the 1970s (23.9% versus 21.8%), but this fell to 21.4% in the 
1980s, while it increased to 26.6% in the high growth countries. 
7. As might be imagined the high growth countries were able to allocate a 
relatively high share of their resources to investment, 23.4% versus 15.4% 
in 1989. While the high growth countries had higher saving rates (18.9% 
versus 13.3%) the differences were not as great as those associated with 
investment. 
8. Several diverse patterns characterize the indebtedness of these two groups 
of countries. One striking fact is that the low growth countries have 
considerably higher external debt burdens, both in terms of the total 
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Table 3 
Country Characteristics: 
High and Low Growth Groups 
(means) 
Growth Group 
Low High Total 
Military Expenditures 
Av Budgetary Share 72-79 12.5 12.9 12.7 
Av Budgetary Share 80-89 15.6 11.4 13.4 
Av Share of GNP 72-79 2.9 2.6 2.8 
Av Share of GNP 80-89 3.0 2.8 2.9 
Av Arms Imports{fotal Imp 72-79 4.9 2.5 3.6 
Av Arms Imports{fotal Imp 80-89 4.5 3.1 3.8 
Growth In: 
GDP 1980-89 0.9 3.7 2.4 
GDP 1970-80 3.8 5.4 4.7 
Investment 1989-90 -4.4 3.0 -0.5 
Investment 1970-80 4.5 7.1 5.9 
Government Consumption 1980-89 0.1 3.8 2.1 
Government Consumption 1970-80 6.2 7.3 6.8 
Exports 1980-89 -0.3 4.7 2.4 
Exports 1970-80 4.3 3.6 3.9 
Imports 1980-89 -4.0 1.9 -0.9 
Imports 1970-80 3.7 5.6 4.7 
Private Consumption 1980-89 1.2 3.4 2.4 
Private Consumption 1970-80 3.6 5.2 4.4 
Composition of Expenditures 
Av Public Share of GNP 72-79 23.9 21.8 22.4 
Av Public Share of GNP 80-89 21.4 26.6 24.2 
Govt Consumpt / GDP 1989 12.0 12.8 12.5 
Investment/ GDP 1989 15.4 23.4 19.7 
Savings I GDP 1989 13.3 18.9 16.3 
Exports I GDP 1989 24.2 26.5 25.4 
Resource Balance/ GDP 1989 -2.0 -4.6 -3.4 
External Debt 
Total Debt/ Exports 1980 171.1 158.7 164.5 
Total Debt/ Exports 1989 433.8 240.9 331.2 
Total Debt/ GNP 1980 51.2 41.2 45.9 
Total Debt/ GNP 1989 101.4 62.2 80.6 
Debt Service I Exports 1980 23.0 19.6 21.2 
Debt Service / Exports 1989 24.7 26.0 25.4 
Interest / Exports 1980 11.7 10.0 10.8 
Interest I Exports 1989 11.8 10.8 11.3 
Notes: High/Low groups based on the discriminant score in Table 5. Variables are from: World Bank 
(1982, 1991), Military variables are from the United States Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency (1984, 1991). 
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debt/GNP ratio and the total external debt to export ratio. Furthermore, 
these gaps widened considerably during the 1980s. 
9. Interestingly enough, however, the debt service ratios of the two groups of 
countries do not reflect this pattern, with the high growth countries 
actually having the highest ratio of debt service to exports in 1989. These 
patterns suggest that much of the debt of the low growth countries is 
concessional and/or of a longer term nature. 
On the surface, the two groups of countries seem to have (obviously other than 
their rate of macro-aggregate growth) their greatest differences with respect to their 
pattern of debt, especially the ratios of debt to exports and GNP. To assess the extent 
to which the pattern of debt differentiates high from low growth countries a 
discriminant analysis was undertaken drawing on the original set of variables from 
the factor analysis. 
In terms of procedure, countries were initially classified as 0 or 1 based on their 
Factor 2 score. The program then attempted, using a stepwise selection process, to 
determine the extent to which our set of economic/military variables could correctly 
classify high and low growth countries. 
The results' of the discriminant analysis again produced several unexpected 
results (Table 4): 
1. As expected the overall rate of Gross Domestic Product during the 1980s 
was the most significant variable differentiating the two groups. However, 
the only other growth variable statistically significant (in terms of the F 
test) in this regard was the rate of growth of exports (which was the 
seventh and last variable entered in the stepwise procedure). 
2. The next most important variable was the share of defense expenditures in 
the central government budget, followed by the share of investment in 
GDP, and the resource balance share of GDP. 
3. The share of arms imports (1972-79) in total imports was the fifth most 
important discriminating variable, followed by the two export variables. 
4. Interestingly, none of the debt variables were statistically significant in 
differentiating the high growth from low growth countries. 
Our profile of high and low growth countries is, therefore, largely based on 
relative resource constraints - especially differences in the proportion of resources 
allocated to investment (domestic resource constraint), and the rate of growth in 
exports (the external resource constraint). In addition the high growth devote 
considerably less of their central government budgets to defense as well as allocating 
a much lower share of their imports to armaments. 
On the basis of the seven discriminating variables noted above, all of the 
countries except Mexico were classified correctly (Table 4). Furthermore the 
probabilities of correct placement (high. or low growth groups) were made with a 
3. Variables statistically significant (with Wilk's Labmda in parenthesis) in forming the 
dicriminant function (in order of importance were: (1) GDP growth 1980-89 (0.569); (2) average military 
expenditures share of the central government budget, 1980-89 (0.467); (3) share of investment in GDP, 
1989 (0.400); (4) resource balance share of GDP, 1989 (0.340); (5) average share of arms imports in total 




Relative Resource Constraint: 1980-90, Country Groupings 
Country Discriminant Initial Probability of 
Score Classification Group Placement 
Factor Group Low High 
2 Score 
Mozambique -1.79 0.2 99.8 
Ethiopia 5.73 100.0 0.0 
Tanzania -1.77 0.05 high 0.02 99.8 
Somalia 1.60 -0.49 low 99.2. 0.8 
Bangladesh -1.25 1.2 98.8 
Malawi -2.16 028 high 0.0 100.0 
Nepal -3.39 0.0 100.0 
Burundi -1.15 0.85 high 1.7 98.3 
Sierra Leone 0.33 67.3 32.7 
Madagascar 1.24 -0.83 low 97.5 2.5 
Nigeria 2.93 -2.72 low 100.0 0.0 
Uganda 0.60 83.3 17.0 
Zaire 1.85 -0.10 low 99.7 0.3 
Mali -2.85 0.98 high 0.0 100.0 
Niger 1.43 -1.33 low 98.6 1.4 
Upper Volta -2.20 0.60 high 0.0 100.0 
Rwanda -0.16 0.38 high 30.1 66.9 
India -1.46 1.06 high 0.6 99.4 
China -3.79 2.15 high 0.0 100.0 
Haiti 1.12 -124 low 96.4 3.6 
Kenya -0.65 0.61 high 0.3 99.7 
Pakistan -0.48 1.22 high 13.2 86.8 
CAR 0.47 -0.23 low 76.9 23.1 
Ghana -0.81 0.16 high 4.9 95.1 
Togo -0.12 0.21 high 32.9 67.1 
Zambia 2.55 -1.11 low 100.0 0.0 
Sri Lanka -2.31 0.84 high 0.0 100.0 
Indonesia -2.33 0.75 high 0.0 100.0 
Mauritania 2.00 -0.50 low 99.8 0.2 
Bolivia 2.42 -1.10 low 99.9 0.1 
Egypt -1.12 0.68 high 1.9 98.1 
Senegal -0.40 0.29 high 16.3 83.7 
Zimbabwe 0.57 -0.39 low 81.8 18.2 
Philippines 0.71 -0.34 low 87.7 12.3 
Ivory Coast 1.45 -0.43 low 98.7 1.3 
Dominican Rep -1.58 0.27 high 4.4 99.6 
Morocco -0.58 0.60 high 10.0 90.0 
Papua -1.88 0.37 high 0.2 99.8 
Honduras 0.72 -0.03 low 88.0 12.0 
Guatemala 1.97 .. t.59 low 99.8 0.2 
Congo 1.23 -0.15 low 97.4 2.6 
Syria 10.38 100.0 0.0 
Cameroon -0.04 0.07 high 38.9 61.1 
Peru 3.02 -1.14 low 100.0 0.0 
Ecuador 0.80 -0.46 low 90.3 9.6 
Paraguay -0.42 0.01 high 15.5 84.5 
El Salvador 1.65 -0.57 low 99.3 0.6 
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Table 4 (contd) 















































































































Notes: * • Miss-classified from original factor analysis. Discriminant analysis based on variables used 
in factor analysis. Based on oblique factor rotation (SPSS, l 990a). 
high level of confidence. The resulting discriminant scores provide a convenient way 
of ranking cowitries in terms of their relative resource constraints (with countries the 
least resource constrained having the highest negative discriminant score). 
The next step in the analysis was to determine whether and to what extent 
defense expenditures impacted differently in the two groups of countries (now 
defined in terms of their respective discriminant scores). For this purpose a simple 
growth model of the form: 
Growth= 
f[Investment, Resource Flows, Military Ex, Arms Imports] 
was estimated. 
This model is of the Benoit type, whereby growth is largely seen as a function 
of investment and foreign resource flows. Military expenditures (and in this case 
arms imports) are then assessed on the margin for their impact on overall economic 
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expansion. Operationally, the scores from the factor analysis provide good proxies 
for the debt, military expenditure and arms import variables. That is because of the 
manner in which they were generated, they only slightly correlated with one another. 
The results for the sample as a whole (Table 5) suggest that: 
1. After accounting for the effect of investment on growth, both debt and 
military expenditures contributed to overall economic expansion. 
2. On the other hand, arms imports do not appear to have a statistically 
significant relationship with economic growth in the 1980s. 
Table 5 
Impact of Defense Expenditures and 
Arms Imports on Third World Growth, 1980-1989: 
Total Sample - Growth (GDPG) 
Investment Growth (GDIG) 
(1) GDPG • 0.67 GDIG 
(6.43) 
Total Sample of Countries 
(standardized coefficients) 
r 2 (adj) • 0.432; df • 52; F • 41.3 
Debt/Government Expenditures (FAC3) 
(2) GDPG • 0.78 GDIG + 0.39 FAC3 
(7.59) (3.10) 
r'(adj) • 0.513; df • 51; F • 28.9 
Defense Expenditures (FAC4) 
(3) GDPG • 0.77 GDIG + 0.31FAC3+0.23 FAC4 
(7 .60) (3.10) (2.55) 
r 2 (adj) = 0.560; df • 50; F • 23.5 
Arms Imports (FACl) 
(4) GDPG = 0.76 GDIG + 0.31 FAC3 + 0.23 FAC4 - 0.08 PACI 
(7.62) (3.16) (2.52) (-0.87) 
r 2 (adj) • 0.558; df • 49; F • 17.74 
Notes: Based on ordinary least squares regression (SPSS 1990). r 2 (adj) • adjusted coefficient of 
determination; df • degrees of freedom; F • F statistic; ( ) • t statistic. 
To see if these patterns held up in the sub-groupings of countries, two sets of 
regressions were performed. The first set gradually eliminated the more resource 
constrained countries (those with the highest discriminant scores). This process was 
undertaken in stages with seven regressions performed, each successive one with a 
sample of countries populated with a higher proportion of countries experiencing 
relatively low resource constraints. The results (Table 6) indicated that: 
1. As was the case with the total sample of countries, investment, debt and 
military expenditures were all statistically significant in contributing to 
overall expansion. 
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2. However as more and more of the resource constrained countries were 
eliminated from the sample, the debt variable ceased to produce a positive 
impact on growth. 
3. Also as the proportion oflow resource constrained countries increased, the 
military expenditure term became more important in contributing to 
economic growth (as evidenced by the increase in the size of it's 
standardized coefficient). 
4. In contrast to the total sample of countries, the arms import variable 
tended to impact negatively on growth, although its coefficient remained 
fairly low and it was only marginally significant. 
Table 6 
Impact of Defense Expenditures and 
Arms Imports on Third World Growth, 1980-1989: 
Sequentially Eliminating Resource Constrained Countries 
(standardized coefficients) 
Sample Included the Countries With: 
Discriminant Score < 2.5 
(1) GDPG • 0.63 GDIG + 0.22 FAC3 + 0.38 FAC4 - 0.14 FACl 
(5.89) (2.10) (3.72) (-1.51) 
r' 2(adj) • 0.579; df • 43; F • 17.18 
Discriminant Score < 1.5 
(2) GDPG • 0.57 GDIG + 0.18 FAC3 + 0.45 FAC4 - 0.21 FACl 
(5.01) (1.61) ' (4.36) (-2.20) 
r'(adj) • 0.633; df = 37; F = 18.70 
Discriminant Score < 1.0 
(3) GDPG = 0.50 GDIG - 0.01 FAC3 + 0.55 FAC4 - 0.24 FACl 
(4.57) (-0.01) (5.26) (-2.44) 
r'(adj) • 0.671; df • 3I; F • I8.82 
Discriminant Score < 0.5 
(4) GDPG = 0.35 GDIG - 0.09 FAC3 + 0.63 FAC4 - 0.25 FACl 
(2.83) (-0.74) (5.61) (-2.47) 
r'(adj) • 0.674; df • 28 F - I7.56 
Discriminant Score < 0 
(5) GDPG • 0.38 GDIG - 0.08 FAC3 + 0.62 FAC4 - 0.24 PACI 
(3.02) (-0.68) (5.35) (-2.32) 
r'(adj) • 0.679; df • 27; F • 17.36 
Discriminant Score < -0.5 
(6) GDPG • 0.26 GDIG - 0.26 FAC3 + 0.67 FAC4 - 0.27 PACI 
(1.80) (-1.82) (5.33) (-2.SI) 
r'(adj) • 0.117; df • 20; F • I6.22 
Discriminant Score < -1.0 
(7) GDPG • 0.39 GDIG - 0.14 FAC3 + 0.57 FAC4 - 0.27 PACI 
(1.97) (-0.68) (5.44) (-2.06) 
r'(adj) • 0.72I; df • I3; F • I2.0I 
Notes: Based on ordinary least squares regression (SPSS I990). r2(adj) = adjusted coefficient of 
determination; df • degrees of freedom; F • F statistic; ( ) • t statistic. 
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Table 7 
Impact of Defense Expenditures and 
Arms Imports on Third World Growth, 1980-1989: 
Sequentially Eliminating Resource Unconstrained Countries 
(standardized coefficients) 
Sample Included the Countries With: 
Discriminant Score > -2.S 
(1) GDPG • 0.72 GDIG + 0.37 FAC3 + 0.16 FAC4 + 0.01 FACl 
(6.21) (3.26) (1.52) (0.08) 
r 2 (adj) • 0.446; df - 45; F • 10.87 
Discriminant Score > -2.0 
(2) GDPG • 0.69 GDIG + 0.40 FAC3 + 0.20 FAC4 + 0.01 FACl 
(5.81) (3.43) (1.80) (0.08) 
r 2 (adj) • 0.452; df • 41; F • 10.30 
Discriminant Score > -1.S 
(3) GDPG • 0.68 GDIG + 0.40 FAC3 + 0.20 FAC4 + 0.02 FACl 
(5.33) (3.18) (1.68) (0.18) 
r 2 (adj) • 0.458; df • 35; F • 9.24 
Discriminant Score > -1.0 
(4) GDPG • 0.67 GDIG + 0.45 FAC3 + 0.19 FAC4 + 0.01 FACl 
(4.74) (3.16) (1.40) (0.05) 
r 2 (adj) • 0.393; df • 31; F • 6.67 
Discriminant Score > -0.S 
(5) GDPG • 0.68 GDIG + 0.51FAC3+0.18 FAC4 + 0.08 FACl 
(4.06) (3.03) (1.18) (0.54) 
r 2 (adj) • 0.393; df • 24; F • 5.53 
Discriminant Score > 0 
(6) GDPG • 0.57 GDIG + 0.67 FAC3 + 0.19 FAC4 + 0.15 FACl 
(2.97) (3.54) (1.14) (0.87) 
r 2 (adj) • 0.424; df • 17; F - 4.88 
Discriminant Score > 0.5 
(7) GDPG • 0.57 GDIG + 0.68 FAC3 + 0.15 FAC4 + 0.14 FACl 
(2.80) (3.50) (0.85) (0.83) 
r 2 (adj) • 0.425; df • 16; F • 4.69 
Notes: Based on ordinary least squares regression (SPSS 1990). r2(adj) • adjusted coefficient of 
determination; df • degrees of freedom; F • F statistic; ( ) • t statistic. 
Looking at clusters of countries obtained by sequentially dropping the least 
resource constrained countries produced yet another pattern (Table 7): 
1. For these countries, the debt variable (Factor 3) remained statistically 
insignificant throughout the exercise. That is, even though countries were 
sequentially dropped from the sample base on their relative resource 
abundance, the growth in investment remained highly significant in 
affecting the overall rate of economic expansion in the 1980. 
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2. In contrast to the resource unconstrained countries, debt played an 
important part in the growth of the resource constrained counties. In fact 
for countries with a discriminant score greater than zero, the standardized 
regression coefficient for this variable was greater than that for 
investment. 
3. Again, in contrast to the resource unconstrained countries, defense 
expenditures were not statistically significant in affecting the overall rate 
of growth. The same was true for anns imports. 
The relationship of anns imports to overall growth is an interesting one. The 
results found here are somewhat counter-intuitive. That is arms imports appear to 
retard growth in the relatively resource unconstrained countries (who in any case 
allocate a much lower proportion of total imports to armaments) but appear neutral in 
this regard in the case of the resource constrained countries. 
While somewhat beyond the scope of this study, part of the explanation for this 
pattern may be found in the original factor analysis. There it was noted that arms 
imports were highly correlated with the share of the debt burden (debt to total 
exports). This pattern suggests that the resource constrained countries have financed 
a large percentage of their arms imports through increases in external debt. As such 
these funds may simply augment or add to foreign exchange holdings - this is 
foreign exchange that would not otherwise be available and therefore of low 
opportunity cost. 
Of course the relationship between arms imports and official debt could also 
indicate that a significant portion of arms transfers was financed through military 
assistance programs. Military equipment from the former USSR and its Warsaw Pact 
allies was generally provided to 'developing country recipients in the form of loan 
aid. The end of the Cold War has reduced the availability of military assistance on 
grant or concessional loan terms. This may well impel erstwhile arms importers in 
the developing world to recalculate the costs and benefits of military equipment 
procurements.• 
CONCLUSION 
Conventional wisdom has long posited that heavy outlays on defense divert 
scarce resources away from directly productive investment (the old guns and butter 
trade-off) and human capital formation (education, health). While this view makes 
intuitive sense, it does not necessarily follow that increased military expenditures 
actually reduce overall economic growth in developing countries as a whole. There 
is a counter-argument with respect to developing countries that suggests defense 
expenditures may act as an econontic stimulus. They finance heavy industry 
(armaments); the acquisition of advanced technologies, the provision of 
employment, and the like. Defense expenditures or a large military establishment 
may attract investment and thus enhance the country's foreign exchange position. 
Arguably, defense expenditures may also provide longer term economic benefits 
4. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for this point. 
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through the development of human resource skills (eg. aviation, engineering, 
chemistry, etc.) which are transferable to the civilian economy. 
The results obtained here are consistent with this dual view of defense 
expenditures. The findings are also consistent with earlier studies for the periods 
prior to 1980. Roughly the same picture has carried over into the 1980s. During this 
period, the more abundantly resource endowed countries appear to have derived 
positive net benefits to growth from increased defense expenditures. 
These findings have several implications for the current policy debate taking 
place in several international agencies, particularly the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank. Both of these institutions are seriously considering reducing 
lending to countries with excessive levels of defense expenditures (Hewitt, 1991; 
McNamara, 1991). While this concern is very commendable on purely humanitarian 
grounds, the above results indicate that reduction in military spending per se would 
probably not result in a major acceleration in overall economic growth, unless 
military expenditure reductions were focused on arms imports. Obviously one could 
still justify these tightened lending conditions on non-economic criteria. 
For the low growth countries (who apparently have derived no net positive or 
negative effects from defense expenditures) the critical question is not one of 
reducing defense expenditure per say but the extent to which the so-called "peace 
dividend" can be: (1) mobilized by the government, and (2) the funds channeled into 
productive activities. As Richards and Waterbury (1990, p. 361) note: 
We may estimate, counterfactually, the returns on alternative uses of the monies devoted to 
defense, but practically nowhere in the world is there any assurance that reduced defense budgets 
would result in increased outlay on say, social welfare or infrastructure. Defense outlays are laden 
with the symbols and sentiments of national pride and survival. People seem prepared to accept 
disproportionate public investment in defense. They and their leaders find less justification in 
using equivalent resources to reduce adult illiteracy or line irrigation ditches. 
REFERENCES 
BABIN, NEHMA, "Military Spending, Economic Growth and the Time Factor," Armed Forces and Society, 
Winter 1989, pp. 249-262. 
BENOIT, EMILE, "Growth and Defense in Developing Countries," Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, 1987, pp. 271-80. 
BISWAS, B., and R. RAM, "Military Expenditures and Economic Growth in Less Developed Countries: An 
Augmented Model and Further Evidence," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 1986, 
pp. 361-72. 
CHAN, STEVE, "Military Expenditures and Economic Performance," World Military Expenditures and 
Arms Transfers, 1986, Washington, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1987, 
pp. 29-38. 
DEGER, SAADAT and S. SEN, "Military Expenditure, Spin-off and Economic Development," Journal of 
Development Economics, 1983, pp. 67-87. 
DEGER, SAADAT and ROBERT WEST, "Introduction: Defense Expenditure, National Security and 
Economic Development in the Third World," in SAADAT, DEGER and ROBERT WEST, Defense, 
Security and Development, London, Francis Pinter, 1987, pp. 1-16. 
FAIN!, R., P. ANNEZ and L. TAYLOR, "Defense Spending, Economic Structure and Growth: Evidence 
Among Countries and Over Time," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 1984, 
pp. 487-98. 
THE IMPACT OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES 41 
FREDERIKSEN, P.C., and R.E. LooNEY, "Defense Expenditures and Economic Growth in Developing 
Countries: Some Further Empirical Evidence," Journal of Economic Development, July 1982, 
pp. 113-25. 
---, 1982a, "Impact of Increased Military Expenditures on Mexican Economic Growth: A 
Preliminary Assessment," Journal Informacion-Comercial Espanola. December 1982, pp. 22-35. 
---,"Defense Expenditures and Economic Growth in Developing Countries," Armed Forces and 
Society, Summer 1983, pp. 633-646. 
---,"Another Look at the Defense Spending and Development Hypothesis," Defense Analysis, 
September 1985, pp. 205-210. 
GROBAR, LISA and RICHARD PORTER, "Benoit Revisited: Defense Spending and Economic Growth in 
LDCS," Journal of Conflict Resolution, June 1989, pp. 318-345. 
HEWITT, DANIEL, "Military Expenditures in the Developing World," Finance and Development, 1991, 
pp. 22-25. 
KICK, EDWARD and BAM DEV SHARDA, "Third World Militarization and Development," Journal of 
Developing Societies, 1986, pp. 49-67. 
LEBOVIC, JAMES and ASHFAQ ISHAQ, "Military Burden, Security Needs and Economic Growth in the 
Middle East," Journal of Conflict Resolution, March 1987, pp. 106-138. 
LEONTIEF, W. and F. DucmN, Military Spending: Facts and Figures, New York, Oxford University Press, 
1983. 
LIM, DAVID, "Another Look at Growth and Defense in Less Developed Countries," Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, 1983, pp. 377-84. 
LooNEY, ROBERT E., "Factors Underlying Venezuelan Defense Expenditures, 1950-83: A Research 
Note," Arms Control, May 1986, pp. 74-108. 
---,"Impact of Military Expenditures on Third World Debt," Canadian Journal of Development 
Studies, 1987, pp. 7-26. 
---, 1987a, "The Impact of Defense Expenditures on the Saudi Arabian Private Sector," Journal of 
Arab Affairs, Fall 1987, pp. 198-229. 
---, ''The Political Economy of Third World Military Expenditures: The Impact of the Regime Type 
of the Defense Allocation Process," Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Spring 1988, 
pp. 21-30. 
---, 1988a, Third World Military Expenditures and Arms Production, London, Macmillan, 1988. 
---, 1988b, "Military Expenditures and Socio-Economic Development in Africa: A Summary of 
Recent Empirical Research," The Journal of Modern African Studies, June 1988, pp. 319-326. 
---, 1988c, "The Role of Defense Expenditures in Iran's Economic Decline," Iranian Studies, 1988, 
pp. 52-83. 
---,"Economic Impact of Rent Seeking and Military Expenditures in Third World Military and 
Civilian Regimes," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, January 1989, pp. 11-30. 
---, 1989a, "Impact of Arms Production on Third World Distribution and Growth in the Third 
World," Economic Development and Cultural Change, October 1989, pp. 145-154. 
---, 1989b, "The Relative Importance of Internal and External Factors in Effecting Third World 
Military Expenditures," Journal of Peace Research, February 1989, pp. 33-46. 
---, ''Militarization, Military Regimes and the General Quality of Life in the Third World,'' Armed 
Forces and Society, Fall 1990, pp. 127-139. 
---, 1990a, "The Role of Military Expenditures in the African Economic Crisis," Jerusalem Journal 
of International Relations, January 1990,fP· 76-101. 
LooNEY, ROBERT, and P.C. FREDERIKSEN, "Defense Expenditures, External Public Debt, and Growth in 
Developing Countries," Journal of Peace Research, December 1986, pp. 329-338. 
---, 1986a, "Profiles of Latin American Military Producers," International Organization, Summer 
1986, pp. 745-752. 
---, 1986b, ''The Future Demand for Military Expenditures in Argentina,'' Arms Control, September 
1986, pp. 197-211. 
---,"Consequences of Military Rule in Argentina," Comparative Political Studies, April, 1987, 
pp. 34-46. 
42 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 
---, 1987a, "Impact of Latin American Arms Production on Economic Performance," Journal of 
Economic, Social and Political Studies, Fall 1987, pp. 309-320. 
McNAMARA, ROBERT, "Reducing Military Expenditures in the Third World," Finance and Development, 
1991, pp. 26-28. 
NEUMAN, STEPHANIE, "International Stratification and Third World Military Industries," International 
Organization, Winter 1984, pp. 172-173. 
RICHARDS, ALAN and JOHN WATERBURRY, A Political Economy of the Middle East: State, Class and 
Economic Development, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1990. 
ROTHSCHILD, K.W., "Military Expenditure, Exports and Growth," Kyklos, 1977, pp. 804-13. 
RUMMEL, R.J., Applied Factor Analysis, Evanston, Illinois, North-Western University Press, 1970. 
SPSS Inc., SPSS/PC +Advanced Statistics 4.0, Chicago, SPSS Inc., 1990. 
--, SPSS Inc., SPSS/PC+ Statistics 4.0, Chicago, SPSS Inc., 1990. 
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, World Military Expenditures and Arms 
Transfers, 1990, Washington, USACDA, 1991. 
WOLF, CHARLES, "Economic Success, Stability and the Old International Order," International Security, 
1981, pp. 75-96. 
WORLD BANK, World Development Repon, 1982, New York, Oxford University Press, 1982. 
WORLD BANK, World Development Repon, 1991, New York, Oxford University Press, 1991. 
